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COMMAIERY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 



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WAR PAPER 26. 




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WAR PAPERS^ 

26 

"Early's Attack upoa l/lTasKiagton., ^uly, i56A." 

PREPARED BY COMPANION 

Major 

HENRY E. ALVORD, 

U. S. Volunteers, 

AND 
READ AT THE STATED MEETING OF APRIL 7, 1897. 



July, 18«4. 



What is popularly known as General Earlv's attack on Wash- 
ington, in Julv, 1S64, was in fact no attack at all. liiit it was a 
notable demonstration, — bold in its inception, — made at a critical 
time, and skilfully, although incompletely, executed. The original 
objects of General Lee were accomplished to a considerable ex- 
tent and the movement inaugurated a vigorous campaign of much 
importance. In itself this might be appropriately called Early's 
Washington Campaign. It covers the only period during the 
civil war when the Capital was in real danger and the only time 
the District of Columbia was actually invaded by the enemy. 
The event, together with its attending circumstances, deserves a 
more complete and connected review than has yet been given. 
It is therefore proposed to here compile the narrative of this 
movement, with its incidents in some detail, and in order that 
the story may be better understood in all its bearings, it seems 
desirable to first rapidly sketch the military events which just 
preceded and the general situation at that period of the war. 

It was the fourth year of the Great American Conflict. The 
vast expenditure of life and treasure, through three long, dismal 
years had not brought assured success to the Union arms. In 
Virginia especially, where the Army of the Potomac contended so 
long with the best armies and most consummate generalship of 
the Confederacy, little permanent advantage had been gained. 
The repeated campaigns against Richmond had failed and twice 
General Lee had succeeded in invading Northern territory ; his 



advance had been checked with difficulty and he had retired to 
Virginia in both instances from discretion, rather than from 
immediate necessity. People were getting tired of the war, — and 
murmurs of opposition were heard all over the land. A presi- 
dential election was approaching, Lincoln's administration was 
to be submitted to the verdict of the people. The Federal Govern- 
ment felt that a crisis was at hand and that political consider- 
ations, as well as the military situation, demanded active oflensive 
operations in the field and made success a necessity. The Union 
leaders, civil and military, knew that the resources of the South 
were being rapidly exhausted ; — there were no more men to 
recruit the armies of the Confederacy, and the necessary supplies 
for its troops in the field were becoming harder and harder to 
procure. It was felt that the time was auspicious for giving the 
final blows to the Rebellion. The great general of the West had 
been brought to Washington for this purpose, and had been 
entrusted with the control of all the forces of the Union, — and the 
immediate command of the troops in Virginia, constituting, at that 
time, one of the largest, most experienced and best equipped 
armies that the world has ever seen. 

The general plan agreed upon for the campaign of 1S64 was 
to concentrate all the Union forces and ofiensive operations 
upon two great objectives, — the Confederate armies of Lee and 
Johnston. While Grant assumed command in the East, it was 
left to Sherman, with the Western army of 100,000 men, to 
move against Johnston, about 80,000 strong. 

How well Sherman did his part, we cannot now stop to con- 
sider, beyond recalling his successful mountain campaign and 
his arrival before Atlanta in July. The fall of that almost vital 
centre, and the march "from Atlanta to the sea," had not yet 
occurred. 

Li Virginia, stretching along the little Rapidan River, the 
Army of the Potomac, with nearly 140,000 fighting men, faced 



the (Confederate) Army of Northern Virginia, then about half 
that number. • 

The military resources, numbers and prowess of the North 
were pitted against the wonderful endurance and heroism of the 
South, in what was hoped to be the final struggle. Grant knew 
that for every life he destroyed he could afford to give two, and 
he threw himself upon his enemy, apparently willing to make 
the awful sacrifice. In those bloody battles of the Wilderness, — 
Spottsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor, — during the six 
short weeks from May 5th to June iSth, the Army of the Poto- 
mac lost nearly yOjOOO men, or more than the entire fighting 
strength of its opponent. 

Grant had met a foeman worthy of his steel. Lee's general- 
ship during this campaign was of the highest order and the conduct 
of his soldiers truly wonderful. Acting necessarily upon the 
defensive, when fighting against such odds, his sturdy veterans, 
poorly clad and under-fed, felt that they were battling for their 
honor and their homes, — and they contested ev^ery inch of the 
"^ sacred soil," — finally compelling Grant to abandon his direct 
movement towards Richmond, as every one of his predecessors 
had done. Although he most positively assei'ted, on the nth of 
May, his determination to fight it out on that line if it took all 
summer, five weeks later and before midsummer Grant shifted 
his base to the river James, and settled down to a siege of Rich- 
m.ond and Petersburg. Both armies had been meantime re- 
cruited to the utmost and on the first of July (1S64) the Army 
of the Potomac (including " Tiie Army of the James ") num- 
bered 150,000 men, and the Army of Northern Virginia had avail- 
able just about half as many. 

But, notwithstanding the extremity of his situation, Lee was not 
content with simply remaining on the defensive. He fully appre- 
ciated the value of time which might be gained by causing a 
diversion of effort on the part of his opponents and the moral 



effect not only upon his own army, but upon the g-eneial situa- 
tion, if an offensive movement, including an invasion of Union 
territory, could be successfully made. Great as was the risk, 
he decided to assume it, and executed the plan with his usual 
skill. Ewell's old corps, now commanded by Early and com- 
prising 1 2,000 to 15,000 experienced men, was withdrawn from 
the front while the change of base to the James was in progress, 
and so quietly as to be entirely unknown to Grant and Meade. 

This movement began on the 13th of June, and the record 
shows that two definite objects were in view. The first was a 
union with the forces under Breckinridge, for the purpose of 
defeating Hunter. The second object was kept secret at the time, 
but acknowledged in later official documents; if the first under- 
taking was successful, Maryland was to be invaded by way of 
the Shenandoah Valley. The first purpose was soon accom- 
plished, for Early joined Breckinridge at Lynchburg on June 
17th, — Hunter's last offensive movement was in front of that city 
on the iSth, and that night the retreat began by way of the Ka- 
nawha. General Lee telegraphed to Early on the iSth : — " Strike 
as quick as you can, and if circumstances authorize, carry out the 
original plan." On June 19th, General Early definitely decided 
upon his march to the North. 

On the 36th of June, Lee, in accordance with the previous 
understanding with Early, proposed the Maryland campaign to 
Jefferson Davis, and one of the features was to be a demonstration 
against Washington, provided the circumstances proved favorable. 
It was also planned to include, if found practicable, a cavalry 
dash upon Point Lookout (Maryland) to liberate the Confederate 
prisoners held at that place ; this project, although never actually 
attempted, was considered so far as to select the Maryland Line, 
under Brig. Gen. Bradley T. Johnson, as the troops best suited 
for this particular service. (The effects of such a movement 
were carefully weighed by General Lee. While having the 



procurement of supplies from the enemy's territory prominently 
in mind, he considered that Grant had then ciianged to an attitude 
strictly defensive, — declared the Army of Northern Virginia, 
although thus weakened, to be quite able to attend to the Army 
of the Potomac, for the time, and stated his main desire and 
object to be to cause Grant to so weaken his line to protect Wash- 
ington as to enable him (Lee) to attack, or, preferably, to induce 
Grant to attack.) On the 27th of June, Early officially named 
his command, which now included the divisions of Breckinridge 
and Gordon, " The Valley District ," and entered upon his move- 
ment down the Shenandoah. This was accomplished so quickly, 
despite the midsummer heat, that Maryland was unexpectedly 
invaded on the 4th of July, General Lew Wallace defeated at the 
Monocacy on the 9th, and on the loth and iith. General Jubal 
A. Early appeared north of the Nation's Capital and within a few 
miles of the centre of the city. 

Washington was not prepared for such an attack. Fortifica- 
tions and armanent were apparently adequate, but troops were 
lacking to man the guns and support them. The defences of 
the city comprised a cordon of sixty forts, half upon either side of 
the Potomac. Thes:e were well-constructed earthworks, con- 
nected with rifle-pits and protected along their front by obstruc- 
tions in various forms. In these forts were mounted almost 
1,000 pieces of artillery, of different sizes, patterns and degrees of 
efficiency. The garrisons of these forts, with sundry outlying posts 
and detatchments, constituted the Department of Washington, 
also called the 23nd Army Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Augur. 
The rolls of this department on the ist of July carried 40,000 
names, but there were actually present for duty only about 30,000 
men, and these were necessarily much scattered. Half of them 
were stationed south of the river, and of those on the north side 
some of the best were sent to the relief of Harper's Ferry on July 
3rd, and more followed two days later, to help VV^allace around 



8 



Frederick (Md.) and on the Monocacy. The hotter included the 
only mounted troops available on this side of the river, being a 
few companies of the Sth Illinois Cavalry. Colonel Gamble, of 
that regiment, had near the city what was called a " Cavalry 
Division," but it was in fact only a camp of dismounted troops, 
and he reported the last of June that his 3,200 men were an un- 
organized lot, with only Soo serviceable horses. 

The quarter of the city particularly threatened at this time was 
guarded by sixteen forts, extending from the Potomac, above the 
Chain Bridge, to the Eastern Branch. Of these, all but two, on the 
extreme left, were within the boundaries of the District. The posts 
of most importance and oftenest mentioned with the events of the 
month (July, 1864) were Fort Reno, on the Rockville turnpike, 
near Tennallytown ; Fort Stevens, on the west side of the vSeventh 
Street road, near Brightwood ; Fort Slocum, a mile farther east; 
and Fort Lincoln, on the Bladensburg pike, near the District line. 
During the first week in July, Lt. Col. Jos. A. Haskin, A. A. D. C, 
commanded this line, with 411 heavy guns and three (3) nominal 
brigades for ganisons ; but these had actually less than 4,000 men 
on duty, or hardly ten men to a gun. Moreover, these troops 
were nearly all 100-day men and militia, temporarily taking the 
place of veteran regiments recently sent to re-enforce Grant. 
For the latter object, tliis Department had been practically 
stripped of its experienced troops. General Barnard, Chief of 
Engineers, after a special inspection of the defences of the city, 
reported to Halleck that some of the heavy artillery sent to Grant 
should be at once returned, saying : — " There are only militia here, 
who can hardly load and tire the guns." General Halleck tele- 
graphed to Grant, on the Sth of July, that there were not sufii- 
cient troops at Washington to meet the expected attack and none 
fit to take the field, while the militia was not reliable even to hold 
the fortifications. General Wallace, after his defeat on the 
Monocacy, instead of endeavoring to cover the Capital, retreated 



towards lialtiniore and, late on the night of Jnlv yth, he sent to 
Halleck the comforting message : — " Yon will have to use every 
exertion to save Washington." 

The War Department was not withont warning of the threat- 
ened attack upon the city Substance as well as shadow preceded 
the coming events. As already stated, it was fully settled that the 
Potomac was to be crossed and at least a demonstration made 
towards Washington, when the Confederates moved northward 
from Lynchburg, instead of returning to Lee. As Early's forces 
marched down the valley manv of his troops were facing home- 
ward ; there was much straggling from the command and some 
officers and men who had good horses pushed on in advance o# 
the main column to visit fi^milies and friends on both sides of the 
Potomac. General Sigel picked up a few of these stragglers and 
on the 3nd of July sent word that Early was coming and would 
leave the Valley and threaten Washington. On the morning of 
July 4th a young cavalrv officer who was on a sort of semi-secret 
service southwest of Washington brought to General Augur, 
commanding the city defences, information in much detail (fully 
verified later) as to the Confederate movement towards the Capital, 
the troops composing it and the principal officeis in command 
This report was promptlv communicated to General Ilalleck, but 
although that officer expressed his personal belief that Early might 
enter Maryland,— and the opinion that, from a military stand 
point, he ought to do so, — the Chief of Staff continued to act as if 
incredulous. And it was still later before General Grant and Gen- 
eral Meade could be convinced that they had been outwitted 
by the rebels. On the evening of July 3rd Grant said posi- 
tively to Halleck,- — " Early's corps is now here [/. c with 
General Lee] and there can be no trooios threatening the 
Valley, except remnants of cavalry and, perhaps^ Breckinridge's 
command" ! The Assistant Secretary of War (Chas. A. Dans 
who was then at City Point, supported Grant by telegraphing i < 



lO 



.Secretary Stanton, the same day : — " Breckinridge may be in the 
Valley but not with over 10,000 men, all told " ! Yet at that 
very hour Martinsburg had been evacuated, Harper's Ferry was 
threatened and Early's cavalry had entered Maryland ! The 
next afternoon Grant and Dana sent word to the War Depart- 
ment that the Confederates in the Valley, whatever they might 
l)e, probably did intend to go into Maryland, but no apprehen- 
sion need be felt in Washington. Hagerstown, Md., was then 
in possession of Early's forces, and there were individual soldiers, 
belonging to that body, then visiting their families within a 
dozen miles of Washington and waiting for the rebel column to 
approach the city, to rejoin their respective commands. At 
noon on July 5th Grant concluded that Ewell's corps (under 
Early) was away from his front, and so informed Halleck. 
Early actually left that position with 15,000 men three weeks 
before ! A day or two later, Meade wired to Stanton that the 
Maryland Line was to join the invading force. Gen. Bradley 
T. Johnson was at that time remounting his command with 
horses found on the peaceful fiirms along the Pennsylvania bor- 
der, and his men were raiding and raping supplies of clothing in 
country stores, dining sumptuously several times a day with old 
neighbors and friends, and filling their haversacks without wait- 
ing for the ceremony of *■• peas on trencher." 

Meade also told Grant, on July 5th, that he had learned that 
Early and Breckinridge had united forces and meant to attack 
Washington. This report was communicated to Halleck, who 
replied with supreme confidence, that although there was almost 
nothing in Baltimore and Washington except militia, and consid- 
erable alarm had arisen, no troops from Grant appeared to be 
needed, as yet! Secretary Stanton coincided in this view, for 
late that same night he said in a message to Governor Brough of 
Ohio, — '' In no event will trt)ops be withdrawn from General 
Grant." 



1 1 



The one person who, up to this time, and siihsequentlv, appears 
to have been best informed as to the movement, strength, character 
and intentions of the rebels, and who sent the most frequent, ex- 
plicit and reliable reports to the War Department, was Mr. John 
VV. Garrett, president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 

On the other hand. General Early was well informed as to the 
strength, composition and character of the Union forces which 
lay in his path, of the garrison at Washington and the guard at 
Point Lookout. He was promptly notified when and to what 
extent Grant detached troops to the relief of Washington, and 
knew in detail of the successive arrivals of these commands at 
Baltimore and Washington even before the troops themselves 
reached the lines in his front. 

These circumstances are not narrated so much by way of 
criticism, as to clearly record the facts antl to emphasize the im- 
mense advantage which accrues to an aggressive military force 
moving on comparatively short, interior lines and through familiar 
and sympathetic territory. 

The march of General Early's command was a notable one 
and creditable to any body of veterans, excepting the unusual ex- 
tent of the straggling and foraging: but this could hardly be 
avoided, under the circumstances, and it was, indeed, intended 
and encouraged, to a considerable degree. Leaving a position 
near Gaines' Mill on the 13th of June, Ewell's old corps, the znd 
of the Army of Northern Virginia, moved on the arc of a circle 
by way of Louisa Court House. Charlottesville, Rockfish Depot 
and Amherst Court House, reaching Lynchburg on the 17th, — 
thence by a detour via Liberty, Salem, Buchanan and Lexington, 
reaching Stanton June 26th, and started down the Shenandoah 
Valley on the 27th. Winchester was passed on July 2nd, 
Martinsburg and Halltown reached on the 3rd, and then, having 
driven Sigel and his troops and the garrison of Harper's Ferry 
onto Maryland Heights, Early stopped no longer to bother with 



12 



these forces which were at his mercv, l)ut crossed the Potomac 
at Shepherdstown on the 4th, and marching through the gaps of 
South Mountain and the Middletown Valley, occupied Fred- 
erick City on the Sth, and on the 9th engaged Wallace and 
Ricketts at Monocacy Junction and the Monocacy bridge. On 
the loth, Gaithersburg was reached, and passing Rockville on 
the nth, the main force camped that day on the Rockville and 
Washington turnpike, or Seventh Street road, near Silver Spring. 

During twenty-eight days the distance accomplished was 
nearly if not quite 500 miles, the railroad being used on two days 
and covering about 60 miles ; two battles were fought meantime, 
besides numerous skirmishes. The actual days occupied in 
marching were twenty and the distance over 440 miles, — an 
average of 32 miles a day. On several occasions the main infan- 
try force marched 30 miles in twenty-four hours, and one day 
nearly 40 miles. This was nearly all done under scorching 
suns and amid clouds of suffocating dust. The men were irreg- 
ularly fed, often insufficiently, and were largely barefooted. It 
is hardly to be wondered at that upon the arrival in front of the 
defences north of Washington, on the nth of July, Early felt 
that his command was unfit for an immediate attack, although 
he knew that Union re-enforcements were hourly expected and 
would very soon render it useless to attempt an assault. 

Early's cavalry, under McCauslaiid and Johnson, were very 
active and bold after crossing the Potomac, and from the reports 
which came from numberless points, one would think that they 
covered all of Maryland, from Cumberland Valley to Chesapeake 
Bay. They did in fact visit most of the important points in 
Washington, Frederick, Carroll, Howard and Montgomery 
counties. Bradley Johnson, with the Maryland Line, and 
Harry Gilmore as an outrider, pushed through Baltimore county 
to Cockeysville, on the Noithern Central Railroad, thence to 
Hartford county, almost to Bel Air, its seat, and returning cut 



13 

the Philadelphia, VVilmini2:ton and Baltimore Railroad at the 
Gunpowder crossing, — skirted the city of Baltimore, and raided 
on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from Beltsville, to Hvatts- 
ville, — before rejoining- Early at Silver Spring on the 1 2th of 
Jidy. This little band of daring horsemen were actually about 
starting from Bladensburg to a rescue at Point Lookout, when 
recalled by General Early, who had decided to cease further 
otiensive operations and retire to Virginia. 

Some precautionary measures were taken at Washington early 
in July, although not all of them tended to help matters. On 
the 2nd, eight (8) batteries of artillery, being about all the troops 
left here fit for field service, were about starting to Grant, when 
Halleck stopped five of them and the next day sent them up to 
Harper's Ferry, to arrest the threatened invasion ; they arrived 
just in time to be beautifully bottled up at that renowned point 
of Federal discomfiture. On the 4th of July Colonel Gamble 
mounted all the men he could at Camp Stoneman, and the day 
following they also started toward Harper's Ferry, under Lt. 
Col. Clendenin of the Sth Illinois Cavalry, getting just far enough 
away to be lost to further usefulness about the Capital. The 
raw troops in the forts north of the river were set to work hand- 
ling the big guns and cutting the brush which had overgrown 
the rifle-pits and ditches. 

By a most fortunate coincidence, a portion of the troops serv- 
ing under General Canby in Louisiana had been ordered to be 
prepared for movement by water, for use elsewhere, — probably 
also to re-enforce Grant. Owing to the special energy and 
activity of Gen. J. J. Reynolds, the ist and 2nd Divisions of the 
19th Corps, each 6,000 strong, were in readiness some days 
earlier than expected, and transports were also ready, so that on 
the 2nd of July the ist Division was able to obey an order to 
immediately embark, proceed to Fortress Monroe and there 
await orders, on shipboard. The ist Division was started at 



14 



once to New Orleans and promised to arrive at Old Point July 
Sth to loth, with the 2nd Division closely following. The im- 
portance of this possibility, due to an efficient commander, be- 
came very manifest not very long after. 

On the 6th of July the various responsible officials seem to have 
first realized the true condition of affiiirs, and activity appeared at 
all points. To say that there was now general alarm in Washington 
and vicinity but faintly expresses the situation. Halleck called 
loudly for help, asking especially for at least one regiment of ex- 
perienced heavy artillery, to scatter among the lOO-day men in 
General Augur's forts. Grant at once started General Ricketts' 
Division of the 6th Corps from City Point, but for some reason 
sent it to Baltimore instead of to Washington. He intended to 
also send 3,000 cavalrymen, in an efficient condition although 
dismounted ; by some unfortunate accident, the latter turned out 
to be a mixed lot of detachments, unorganized, without arms or 
equipment, half sick, and a hindrance anywhere, rather than a 
help. 

On July Sth, Halleck had evidently become convinced that Wash- 
ington needed material additional aid, for he then telegraphed to 
Grant as follows: — '^ It is the impression that one-third of 
Lee's entire force is with Early and Breckinridge and that Ransom 
has some 3,000 or 4,000 cavalry. None of the cavalrymen sent 
np by you have arrived here yet, nor do we get anything from 
Hunter. Troops sent from the James River should come here, 
not to Baltimore, for here they must be supplied and equipped. 
If you propose to cut off this raid and not merely to secin-e our 
depots, we must have more forces here. Indeed, if the enemy's 
strength is as great as represented (30.000 to 30,000 men) it is 
doubtful if the militia can hold all of our defences. I think that 
very considerable re-enforcements should be sent directly to 
Washington." 

The vSecretarv of War made hasty requisitions on Pennsylvania, 



15 



New York, and Massachusetts for militia for service loo days, 
or even 60 days, around Baltimore and Washington. The Gov- 
ernor of Pennsylvania proclaimed martial law and called upon 
the citizens to arm and protect the southern l)order of the State. 
Various shifts were made in the troops and every conceivable 
expedient applied to increase the efficiency of the meagre gar- 
risons around the Capital ; the activity of the infantry militiamen 
in artillery drills and in brush-cutting was commendablv in- 
creased. 

The disaster at Monocacy on Saturday, the 9th of July, which, 
as already noted, involved that part of Ricketts' Division of the 
6th Corps which had already arrived, naturally added to the ex- 
citement. Consternation ensued when, on Sunday and Mon- 
da}', the Confederate cavalry hovered around Baltimore, burned 
the house of Governor Bradford, within four miles of the city 
hall, — cut oft' railroad communication with Harrisburg and Phila- 
delphia, destroyed the Gunpowder bridge, — captured two rail- 
road trains, with Major Gen. Franklin and other officers on 
boardoneof them,andthen moved towards Washington. Eminent 
citizens of Maryland declared Baltimore in great peril and ap- 
pealed to President Lincoln for help, which he was powerless to 
give. Wallace, arriving at Baltimore, sent word to Halleck 
that the panic there was heavy and increasing. Alarm bells 
were rung in the city, calling the leagues of loyal citizens to 
assemble and defend their property and homes. Dana (having 
returned to Washington) reported to Grant a similar feeling at 
the Capital, adding that the city w^as filling with country people 
fleeing before the enemy. The War Department was anxiously 
inquiring about fresh regiments from Massachusetts, New York 
and Pennsylvania, and at the same time General Couch was ask- 
ing that batteries be sent from Washington to Harrisburg to pro- 
tect tlie line of the Susquehanna. But these communications 
were unpleasantly interrupted by the cutting of telegrapli lines 



i6 



to Baltimore and Harrisburg. Special preparations were made 
by citizens and local organizations to defend Philadelphia, Wil- 
mington and Baltimore, and the roads between these cities. 
Halleck ordered General Cadwalader to examine the hospitals 
at Philadelphia and forward to Washington all men and officers 
fit to serve in intrenchments, even if unable to march. The 
District militia was called out and the Qiiartermaster General 
left his proper duties to organize employees and clerks, and 
march them to the forts about the city. Scouting parties were 
kept actively moving over in Fairfax county and up and down 
the river, to guard against any new developments in that region. 
Arrangements were made for destroying the bridges across the 
Potomac and the Eastern Branch, at a moment's notice. Grant 
was finally prevailed upon, by direct appeal from the President, 
to start the rest of the 6th Corps to Washington, and portions of 
the 19th Corps, then about arriving at Fortress Monroe from. the 
Gulf, were ordered to move on to the Capital without dis- 
embarking. 

All da}' Sunday, July the loth,* the utmost activity prevailed 
in this city. General Augur and his efficient staff, from head- 
quarters at the old Doctor Gunnell house, which stood on the 
present vacant corner lot adjoining the Department of Justice, 
were busy placing the provisional troops in position along the 
forts, — andpartsof the garrisons south ofthe Potomac were hurried 
over in addition. Col. Chas. R. Lowell, Jr., brought most of 
his regiment, the 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry (in which I was 
then a line officer), from Falls Church and formed a skirmish line 
outside the forts from Reno to Stevens, just as the Confederate 
cavalry under McCausland appeared in their front. The 3nd 
Massachusetts, with a squadron of the 8th Illinois Cavalry, under 



*It now seeiTis expedient, although involving some repetition, to give 
grouped by themselves, the principal events of each ofthe days remaining 
to be recorded. 



17 

Captain Wells, which had been cut oft' from its regiment at 
Monocacy, and a battalion of remounts under Major Fry of the 
i6tli Pennsylvania Cavalry, were all placed under Colonel Lowell. 
Together these made about i ,000 men, being the only mounted 
force and almost the only troops outside the intrenchments to 
oppose the advance of the enemy. This little body of horsemen 
stood their ground bravely for three days, repeatedly repulsing 
aggressive movements of the rebel cavalry, and losing officers and 
men daily, in action, — in all about one hundred. 

During Sunday, also, some re-arrangement was made in the 
commands. Col. J. M. Warner of the ist Vermont Artillery 
(who died suddenly in New York, March 16, 1S97) '^^^ given 
the brigade, with its centre at Fort Reno. Brig. Gen. M. D. 
Hardin, U. .S. V., was assigned to a division extending from 
the river to Fort Slocum, with headquarters at Tennallytown. 
Maj. Gen. Alex. D. McCook reported to General Augur and 
was posted at a Reserve camp, on the Piney Branch of Rock 
Creek, out beyond Mt. Pleasant, with authority over the whole 
line of " Northern Defences of Washington." General Ord also 
reported in Washington, and was sent on to take command at 
Baltimore. This day, the ist and 2nd Divisions of the 6th Corps 
were embarking at City Point, one vessel with men of the 19th 
Corps reached Old Point Comfort, — -Early's main body was pass- 
ing through Rockville towards the Capital, — and Johnson's 
cavalry was at Reisterstown, Cockeysville and Parkton, in Balti- 
more county, and reported on the York road, 7 miles from the 
Monumental Citv. 

General Grant telegraphed to Halleck strongly urging him to 
act without awaiting the arrival of the troops he was sending and 
to " Get into Early's rear and destroy him." Something of the 
peculiar and strained relations of the time, as to superior com- 
manil, may be read between the lines, in this characteristic reply 
by Halleck: — " VV^hat you sav about getting into Early's rear is 



i8 



probably correct, but unfortunately we have no forces here for the 
field. All such forces were sent to you, long ago. What we 
have here are raw militia, invalids, convalescents from the hospi- 
tals, a few dismounted batteries, and the dismounted and un- 
organized cavalrymen you sent up from James River. Witli these 
we hope to defend our immense depots of stores and the line of 
intrenchments (extending 37 miles) around the city. But what 
can we do with such forces in the field against a column of 20,000 
veterans.^ One-half of the men here cannot march at all. The 
only body fit for the field was Ricketts' Division, which has been 
defeated and badly cut up under Wallace. If those remains can 
hold Baltimore till re-enforced, I shall be satisfied." 

Yet despite the anxiety and vexation of Halleck over the un- 
comfortable condition in which he found himself at Washington, 
that stern old soldier was able to appreciate the ludicrous in- 
cidents certain to occur at the most serious times. A new-Hedged 
Brigadier, spoiling for glory, telegraphed from the Fifth Avenue 
Hotel, New York, where he had first established his headquarters, 
offering to command the defences of Washington. The Chief 
of Statl' replied on Monday noon, the hour of greatest peril, — 
" We have five times as many generals here as we want, but are 
greatly in need of privates. Any one volunteering in that capacity 
will be thankfully received." 

Monday, the nth, was really the critical day of the entire 
event. In the midst of heat and dust. General Early's infantry 
arrived, at the end of a forced march, in sight of the fortifications, 
and before these had been materially strengthened or re-enforced, 
Hardin reported to Augur that the pickets of Warner's brigade 
in the vicinity of Fort Reno were in better shape than those about 
Stevens and Slocum. Early evidently soon discovered this, for 
after demonstrating towards Reno, he left his cavalry there, with 
one or two rifled guns, to occupy attention and shifted his main 
force to the east of Rock Creek, coming up even inside the prac- 



^9 

tice targets of Fort Stevens. His headquarters were established 
at Silver Spring. At noon McCook reported from the Reserve 
camp: — "The enemy is advancing to my front, witli cavahy, 
artillery, and infantry." Hardin soon added : — ■" The emeny is 
tearing down fences, moving troops, with bands playing, and 
is apparently preparing for a grand assault ! . . . Hurry up the 
6th Corps !" A little later, signals from down the river reported the 
first transports passing Fort Washington. McCook found the forts 
so weak that he abandoned the " Reseve camp" and moved all 
its troops, consisting of two militia regiments and two pro- 
visional batteries, into the rifle-pits. Hardin assisted by weaken- 
ing the left of his line to a dangerous degree and hurrying men 
to help out at Stevens and Slocum. 

During the forenoon, Gen. Geo. C. Thomas (of the Qiiarter- 
master Department) was ordered by Augur to turn out all the 
District militia, nominally eight regiments. General Meigs was 
at the same time mustering his employees and clerks, organized 
in battalions a year previous, but never before armed ; of these 
there were nearly 2,500 in all. One thousand of them relieved 
soldiers guarding the public buildings and military stores, and 
after dark, under command of General Rucker, 1,500 were 
marched out to the vicinity of Forts Slocum and Saratoga. vStill 
later Colonel Price, with 3,800 convalescents, etc., organized 
as a provisional brigade, reached similar positions on the line. 
Maj. Gen. Q. A. Gilmore, arrived to command troops, reported 
to General Augur and was sent to Fort Lincoln, on the right of 
Meigs. Maj. Gen. H. G. Wright, U. S. V., arrived towards 
evening, with a few regiments representing the advance of the 
6th Corps, and found orders awaiting him to march his com- 
mand out to Chain Bridge and camp there. The full knowledge 
of the situation and its needs, on the part of General Augur and 
his staff, was clearlv shown by the fact that as Wright was 
moving- westward on Pennsvlvania Avenue he was met bv Col. 



20 



J. H. Taylor, Adjutant General of the Department, and that 
officer at once took the responsibility of turning Wright and his 
troops up Eleventh Street, and directed that they go out and 
bivouac in rear of Fort Stevens, remaining in reserve till other- 
wise ordered. It proved that this action was most timely. At 
Chain Bridge and its vicinity these troops would have been use- 
less, but the veterans of the 6th Corps found active duty await- 
ing them the moment they came in sight of Fort Stevens. 

The Confederates became so aggressive during the afternoon, 
and annoyed the militia in the rifle-pits so much, that the guns 
of Forts Stevens and De Russy were brought into play to 
dislodge sharpshooters from houses occupied by them, close up 
to the forts. This was none too soon, for the rebels had come so 
near as to shoot our soldiers standing on the parapets of Fort 
Stevens. The artillery pro^'ng insufficient, a strong skirmish 
line of militia was moved forward at evening, but this was vig- 
orously attacked by the enemy and was actually in full retreat, 
when some Pennsylvania regiments of the ist Brigade, 2nd 
Division, 6th Corps, came up just in time to relieve the line, re- 
establish it, and hold it. The Confederates maintained position 
well in advance of Silver Spring, and showed no signs of yield- 
ing. There was intermittent fighting between these skirmish 
lines all through the night. The raw troops in and about the 
forts served the guns well and made a fair show in the field, at 
first, —but the strength displayed along the line, as a whole, was 
hardly such as io prevent an attack by Early, even as late as 
Monday night, had he decided to make one. 

Up to that time, five transports had reached the city with de- 
tachments of the 6th Corps, and one vessel bringing two regi- 
ments of the 19th Corps. It was during the afternoon of this 
day that Maj. Harry Gilmore's raiding party burned the house 
of the Governor of Maryland, on Charles Street Avenue in the 
suburbs of Baltimore, and in the afternoon the bridge over the 



21 



Gunpowder River, on the Philadelphia and Wilmington Railroad, 
was seized, with passing trains, and partially destroyed. Dana 
sent a long message to Grant at night describing the situation ; in 
this he estimated Early's strength at twenty to thirty thousand 
and said it was futile to think of cutting oft' his retreat with the 
Union forces available. 

The closing scenes of the little campaign which is being fol- 
lowed occurred on Tuesday, tlie i2th of July. The morning 
opened with telegraphic communications cut oft' east, north and 
west from the city, and continued doubt and anxiety as to the inten- 
tions of the enemy. The veteran troops from City Point and the 
Gulf were exasperatingly slow in arriving. Lowell's cavalry on 
the left was having lively work to keep the Southern horsemen at 
a respectful distance, — in looking after the river roads and prevent- 
ing the enemy's light artillery from occupying advantageous posi- 
tions on the Rockville Pike. General Hardin reported rebel 
bands playing early in the morning, with evident activity in their 
line, and skirmishers in his front appearing stronger. Similar 
I'eports came from all along the fortifications. Qiiartermaster 
General Meigs got fairly hold of his provisional brigades and or- 
ganized a Division in the intrenchments from Stevens to Totten, 
numbering some 5,000 men ; on putting out a skirmish line, he 
also found the enemy and had two men shot. General Gilmore 
and his lieutenants, on the right, reported unfavorable conditions. 
But 1,000 of the 19th Corps had arrived, and although there was 
a crowd of convalescents, they were unarmed. Fort Lincoln 
was weak, the rifte-pits in that vicinity still empty and the Blad- 
ensburg pike seemed open to a cavalry dash, with the cavalry 
near at hand for that purpose. Major Darling's handful of tem- 
porarily mounted troops had been sent out Bladensburg way and 
found a force of rebel cavalry estimated at 1,500, with some light 
rifled guns, near the Maryland Agricultural College (S miles 
from the Capitol)r. Bradley Johnson had torn up the Baltimore 



22 



and Ohio railroad from Beltsville to the Paint Branch and was 
destroying the bridge there. He drove the Union troopers back 
to the forts and appeared to be crossing to the east and south of 
the raihoad and the Baltimore turnpike. Work was suspended 
at the Navv Yard, half the men put on guard and the rest hurried 
up to the defences on the Eastern Branch. The day was in- 
tensely hot and dry, and wherever troops moved, on roads or in 
tields, great clouds of dust arose giving an exaggerated effect. 
Halleck wired to Grant :—" The boldness of this movement 
would indicate that the enemy is stronger than we supposed. 
He appears to be preparing to attack to-morrow (13th) , but I 
think Washington is now pretty safe, unless the raw troops in 
the forts give way before they can be re -enforced." 

Up to this time there had been much confusion as to the 
limits and relations of the various commands. Forts, rifle-pits, 
skirmish lines, reserves and city guards seemed to have separate and 
largely independent commanders, and troops arriving at the wharves 
were thence moved to positions by orders other than those of 
the Major General commanding the Department of Washington. 
Dana telegraphed to Grant complaining bitterly that there was 
" no head to things." He said Hunter was talked of for general 
command but Stanton thought he would not do. Dana added : — 
"'General Halleck will not give orders except as he receives 
them ;> the President will give none, and until you direct, posi- 
tively and explicitly, what is to be done, everything will go on in 
the deplorable and fatal way in which it has gone on for the past 
week." Grant replied that General Wright should be put in 
command of all field troops and movements, that all of the 6th Corps 
and two divisions of the 19th ought to be in Washington by 
noon of the next day and then Wright should '"go for " Eaily at 
once. 

Meanwhile General Augur was endeavoring to reorganize the 
forces which had been changing almost hourly, for days, so it 



23 

had been next to impossible to keep track of them. General 
McCook was given command of the entire line of defences north 
of the river and all their troops, with General Hardin in control 
from Fort Sumner on the left, to Fort De Russy, inclusive ; 
General Meigs from Fort De Russy to Fort Totten, and General 
Gilmore from Fort Totten to Fort Lincoln, including, also, the 
19th Corps as fast as it should arrive and reach position on the 
right. General Wright was still to hold the main body of 
the 6th Corps in reserve on the Seventh Street road and Col. M. 
N. Wisewell was made Provost Marshal General of the Depart- 
ment and given the immediate supervision of affairs within the 
city limits. 

But the Confederates were becommg altogether too offensive 
between Silver Spring and Fort Stevens to be managed by raw 
troops and, as already stated, parts of the 6th Corps had to be 
thrown into the field in front of our forts, as fast as they came up 
from the wharves. The skirmishing was active all day and the 
rebel line seemed to be getting stronger and stronger and slowly 
approaching the fortifications. The artillery of Fort Stevens was 
again brought into action and it was decided to assault Early's 
line, under cover of the guns. Brig. Gen. Frank Wheaton, U. 
S. v., was assigned to this duty, with the ist Brigade and thiee 
regiments of the 3rd Brigade of Getty's (2nd) Division. These 
three regiments were under Colonel Bidwell, who was killed 
three months later, at Cedar Creek. After a pause, 36 shots 
were fired from the fort, and following the last one, at just about 
5 o'clock, Wheaton threw forward his men. The Confederate 
line received this attack with a firm and stubl)orn resistance and 
the day closed with a spirited engagement, which was continued, 
by the uncertain light of a new moon, until after 10 o'clock. The 
Union line held all the ground it gained, but sustained a loss ex- 
ceeding 200, including an unusual proportion of officers. The 
dead were buried where they fell, and, later, the War Depart- 



24 



ment created a small National Cemetery at this place, which is 
still maintained on the east of Brightwood Avenue or the Mont- 
gomery turnpike, quarter of a mile beyond the site of Fort 
Stevens. It is to be regretted that this one earthwork, which 
was the chief obstacle between Earlv and the city, has been 
abandoned and allowed to go to ruin. If, as may be fairly 
claimed, it saved the Capital, Fort Stevens certainly deserved 
to be well preserved in perpetuity. The official reports and the 
graves themselves in the little enclosure mentioned show that 
the losses were mainly from Pennsylvania and New York regi- 
ments, there being also some from Maine, Vermont and Massa- 
chusetts troops. The 9Sth Pennsylvania Volunteers lost the 
most men. and a handsome monument on the spot gives the 
names of those wounded as well as killed belonging to this regi- 
ment. 

Whether this action was ever officially named does not appear, 
but it might very appropriately be called the '' Battle of Bright- 
wood," or even the " Battle of Washington. " The loss was 
comparatively small, but the event itself was one which deserved 
to be specially commemorated. Excepting tiie casualties of the 
cavalry skirmishers near Fort Reno, on this and days just before, 
this is the only occasion in the Nation's histoi"y when hostile 
armies met so near the seat of government, and men fell in battle 
within the confines of the District of Columbia, fighting in the 
defence of the Federal Capital. 

Immediately after the fighting ceased, Tuesday night, General 
Early consulted his lieutenants, and it having been then demon- 
strated that the 6th Corps was in action in his front, it was de- 
cided to retire. The cavalry was brought in closer on the flanks 
and the retreat commenced. The next morning no rebel force 
could be found in front of Washington and two days later Early 
and his entire command crossed the Potomac in safety, between 
the mouth of the Monocacy and Goose Greek. 



25 

As a sort of parting salute the Confederates burned the resi- 
dence of the Postmaster General (Montgomery Blair) at Silver 
Spring. The neighboring liouse of Frank P. Blair, Senior, fared 
little better ; it was tipped over and valuable papers were stolen 
and destroyed ; worse yet, a stock of fine old wines and liquors 
disappeared among the rank and file of the '' Grey -backs," 
accustomed for years to be content with a third-rate article of 
domestic applejack ! 

Nearly all the facts presented in this narrative accord with the 
official War Records, or have been verified by other authentic 
although unpublished documents. As vouchers for some of the 
important points I append an interesting account of the event by 
Gen. M. C. Meigs, and the official report of Gen. Robert E. Lee 
to the Confederate Secretary of War. In his report to General 
Lee, General Early wrote as follows : — " I reached the front 
of the Washington fortifications with my men too much exhausted 
to immediately attack. I determined at first to make an assault, 
but before it could be done, it became apparent that the enemy 
had been strongly re-enforced and we knew that the 6th Corps 
had arrived from Grant's army.* I found the fortifications very 
strong and well constructed, with their approaches swept by 
cross-fires. After consultation, I reluctantly decided to retire, and 
did so on the night of July 12th, after threatening the city all 
day. * * * I am sorry I did not succeed in capturing Wash- 
ington and releasing our prisoners at Point Lookout, but the 



* Early's cavalry appeared before Fort Reno on Sunday. His main force 
reached its advance position by noon of Monday. The ist Brigade, 2nd 
Division, 6th Corps, landed at Washington Monday afternoon. The rest 
of the 2nd Division landed on Tuesday forenoon. The 3rd Brigade, ist 
Division, arrived Tuesday afternoon ; the rest of the ist Division that 
night and Wednesday. A fragment of the 19th Corps landed the evening 
of Monda}', and more of the ist Brigade, ist Division, on Tuesday. The 
rest of the ist Division and the 2nd Division reached Washington some 
days later. 



26 



latter was impracticable after I determined to retire. There was 
intense excitement and alarm in Washington and Baltimore and 
all over the North, and my force was very greatly exaggerated. 
My infantry did not exceed 10,000; Breckinridge's infantry, al- 
though nominally much stronger, really did not exceed 2,500 
muskets. 

I had been serving in and around Washington for a year prior 
to Early's coming, much of the time as an assistant to General 
Augur's Provost Marshal, on both sides of the Potomac, and 
was fairly familiar with the condition of the city's defences and 
the troops in and about them. On Sunday, July loth, I rejoined 
my regiment and being on that thin and weak skirmish line of 
Union cavalry, stretching across the Seventh Street road to 
Tennallytown and beyond, — seeing the overpowering fOrce of the 
enemy in front, — knowing that no veteran re-enforcements of 
consequence had arrived and that there was little but raw militia 
and a demoralized populace in our rear, — I felt then, — as I do 
still, — that for the greater part of two days the city of Washing- 
ton was absolutely at the mercy of the Confederates. It is manifest 
that Early could not have held the city for more than a day, and 
that he might have lost a large part of his command ; this he well 
understood, for he was fully informed of the situation. But occu- 
pation for that briefperiod would have accomplished much. There 
can be little doubt that had the attacking party been led by a bolder 
and more vigorous general, — such an one as " Stonewall " Jack 
son. Job Pickett or *•' Jeb" Stuart. — President Lincoln and his 
Cabinet would have been forced to leave the Capital, the Federal 
buildings and archives would have been destroyed, as well as 
enormous depots of military stores, and considering the critical 
political condition of the country at that time, who can tell what 
would have been the eft'ect upon the destiny of the Nation? 

But Jubal Early made no earnest attack. He brought his 
forces up before our intrenchments, — drove in our skirmishers, — 



27 



sent his own within 20 rods of Fort Stevens, — shot the guards 
upon the parapets of our forts, — forced his cavalry within five 
miles of the White House, — and had a smart hrush at Bright- 
wood, — hesitated, delayed, and concluded that the forts looked 
ominous, and that re-enforcements were at hand, — and at mid- 
night on July 1 3th he withdrew. 

Meanwhile the veterans of the 6th and 19th Corps landed at 
the Potomac wharves, and Washington was safe ! 

^ ■^ ^ ■^ -^ -sK- 

It was no time for joking, then, — but I am told that, later, the 
" Johnnies " used to say : — ''The day of Jubal-E. had come, — 
but Jubal didn't know it !" 

It can be easily understood how critical the Federal Govern- 
ment regarded the situation at the Capital. Washington must 
be rendered safer, — Early and his hosts must not be allow^ed to 
escape, — and a decisive victory somewJicrc in the East was felt 
to be of vital importance. (This was to be accomplished on 
ground new to Union victories, and under a comparatively new 
leader!) More troops were detached from Grant and hurried to 
Washington, — infantry, artillery and cavalry. Grant himself 
was summoned to this city and held an anxious council wMth 
Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck. 

As the result of this conference, the President united the Mid- 
dle Department and the Departments of Washington, West 
Virginia and the Susquehanna in one great '' Middle Military 
Division." General Grant, always most sagacious in his choice 
of military lieutenants, selected for the new and important com- 
mand, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan. 

At this point may be said to begin Sheridan's Shenandoah 
Campaign, — and at the same point ends Early's Campaign 
aofainst Washington. 



28 



APPENDIX A. 



Extract from a letter of Bvt. Maj . Gen. M. C. Meigs., 
U. S. A., dated Washifigton, D. C, Jtdy 16, i8g4. 

(From War Records, Vol. XXXVII. Part i, p. 25S.) 



" Twice while McClellan was on his way to the James, or 
there, the Confederates put Washington in danger, by way of the 
Shenandoah ; but there were troops here, then, to defend it. 
Now, with an enterprising and uniformly successful commander, a 
larger army, trained to confidence and success through three years 
of doubtful conflicts, and two months of most bloody, desperate 
and successful fighting, the crippled army of Lee, relying upon 
the intrenchments of Richmond and the weakness of the Wash- 
ington garrisons, sends again, by the familiar road, a column of 
3^,000 or 30,000 men, breaks communications north and east of 
Baltimore, defeats a veteran Division of the Army of the Potomac 
(Ricketts') hastily thrown across the line of march, drives 
Wallace and Ricketts back upon Baltimore, and sending small 
parties to alarm and raise the neighborhood, to burn the house of 
the Governor and prevent the troops of the north passing beyond, 
alarmed Baltimore ; this column concentrates suddenly upon the 
north front of Washington. 

"The invalids, now called Veteran Reserves, of the police 
garrison of Washington, are relieved from guard duty by the 
clerks of the Quartermaster General's office. The old soldiers 
in hospital and in convalescent and distribution camps are 
hastily organized into provisional regiments ; dismounted cavalry- 
men, for whom horses are not here, are sent into the trenches to 
act as infantry, and the mechanics, agents, clerks and overseers, 



29 



and laborers of the depot qiiartennaster, who can for a day or two 
in emergency be detached from their ordinary duties, are or- 
ganized and armed and marched to the rifle-pits. The head of 
the column of the 6th Corps of veterans from the Army of the Po- 
tomac arrives from Petersburg on the day that the head of the 
19th Corps reaches Washington from New Orleans, and on the 
very day that the rebels send their skirmishers within forty rods 
of the salient of Fort Stevens, and within sight of Fort Reno. 
The former on the Seventh Street road and the latter on the 
Rockville or Tennallytown road. 

****** 
" I had offered the services of the quartermaster's men, of whom 
we had about 3,000 armed, who were disposable for the purpose, 
to General Halleck. He thought that it would be enough for 
them to guard the stores in the city against riot or incendiary 
attempts. I then offered them to General Augur, commanding the 
forces, and he gladly accepted them and requested that they be 
sent to Maj. General McCook at Fort Stevens. I called the men 
out ; 400, who were under General Augur's quartermaster, had 
been sent out in the morning, 700 more had gone to the line in 
front of Alexandria, and I marched about 5 P. M. (Monday) with 
1.500 or 2,000 towards Fort Stevens. Reported to McCook just 
as it grew dark, and he sent an officer from Fort Slocum to point 
out the position he wanted us to occupy. We found it as well 
as we could in the darkness. The new moon gave a little light 
and our forces, which the next morning numbered 1,500, ex- 
tended to McCook's line just one mile to the right of the center of 
the attack. We bivouacked on this line, part of the men in the 
trenches, the rest close in the rear. I slept in an orchard, 

wrapped in a poncho, with my horse tethered to an apple tree. 

* * * * * * 

"• The next morning (Tuesday) we got up wagons, rations, 
shelter- tents, cooking utensils, intrenching tools, axes, and worked 



30 

to perfect the defenses and clear the timber and brush from our 
front. During the day skirmishing was continuous in front of 
Stevens, where the advance of the 6th Corps, under Wright, en- 
gaged the enemy. * * * The day wore away. I visited the 
lines to my right in which no troops occupied the trenches or 
rifle-pits. The forts, however, which are about a mile apart 
and on commanding positions, were garrisoned. General Gil- 
more was at Fort Saratoga, several miles to the right, and to- 
wards evening telegraphed for re-enforcements, and I sent him 
nearh- the whole of my reserve, 2,000 men. We received 
orders to have all our troops under arms at 3 o'clock the next 
morning. * * * 1 was up at 2 o'clock (Wednesday, July 
13th,) my men were all under arms and I rode to Fort Stevens 
and took position on the parapet to watch the breaking day. 
The gray dawn spread over the landscape widely extended in 
sight. An occasional shot from a suspicious picket, and the low 
of a cow or the bray of a mule, alone bi^oke the stillness of the 
morning, and at last the sun arose and all remained quiet. 
Cavalry were sent out and reported the rebel positions all aban- 
doned. * * * We remained in position till full daylight and 
then sent the men to their breakfast and continued our work of 
clearing oft obstructions to our fire and completing intrenchments. 
* * * I rode along the line right and left ; my command ex- 
tended in line of battle two miles and was 5,000 strong. (It was 
the right wing of that portion of the army which was directly in 
front of the enemy.) * * * 

" The next day (Thursday), the enemy having retired, * * * 
I had orders to return to Washington and release my volunteer 
civilians and return them to their ordinary w^ork. All this time, 
the Qiiartermaster's Department was fitting out the troops which 
arrived from Petersburg and New Orleans, with horses, wagons 
or artillery. We mounted 2.000 or 3,000 cavalry ; gave 1,000 or 
2,000 horses to horse artillery batteries ; supplied 15,000 men 



31 



with a new wagon train, and mounted most of the general officers, 
and started them, a well equipped, moving column, in pursuit of 
the retreating enemy. 

"And so the campaign and siege are over and the administration 
is blamed by the Copperheads and applauded by all true, loyal 
citizensfor turning back the tide of rebel invasion, and this without 
getting a single man from Maryland, supine Pennsylvania, or 
from the Governor of New York. Some of the men called out 
when the danger was pressing are beginning to arrive, now that 
it is over." 



APPENDIX B. 



Gcn'l Robt. E. Lee^ on Early s Washington Campaign of 
July^ 1864. 

(From War Records, Vol. XXXVII, Part i, p. 346.) 



Hd. Qrs. Army of Noujiiekn Vikginia, 

Jiily jg, 1864. 

To Hon. Snc'y of War, 

Richmond. 

Sir : — I have the honor to transmit herewith, the report of 
General Early of his late operations in the Valley and in Mary- 
land. 

In forwarding this report I deem it proper to state briefly for 
the information of the Dept., the object of detaching the force 
under Gen'l Early. I think, however, that it would not be 
prudent to give publicity to this statement at the present time. 



32 



Finding that it would be necessary to detach some troops to 
repel the tbrce under General Hunter, w'h was threatening 
Lynchhuig, I resolved to send one that would be adequate to 
accomplish that purpose effectually, and, if possible, strike a de- 
cisive blow. At the same time. Gen. Early was instructed, if his 
success justified it, and the enemy retreated down the Valley, to 
pursue him, and, if opportunity offered, to follow him into 
Maryland. It was believed that the Valley could then be effect- 
ually freed from the presence of the enemy and it was hoped tiiat 
by threatening Washington and Baltimore, Gen'l Grant would 
be compelled either to weaken himself so much for their pro- 
tection, as to afford an opportunity to attack him. or that he 
might be induced to attack us. 

After the retreat of Gen'l Hunter towards Western Va. his 
pursuit by Gen'l Early was attended with great difficulty, owing 
to the obstacles in the way of supplying our troops. At the same 
time the presence of Gen'l Hunter's forces in the Kanawha Val- 
ley endangered important interests in Southwestern Va. It was 
tho't that the readiest way to draw him from that region would 
be to push down the Valley and enter Md., and at the same time 
it was hoped that the other advantages of such an invasion, before 
alluded to, might be secured. In addition to these considerations 
there were other collateral results, such as obtaining military 
stores and supplies, that were deemed of sufficient importance to 
warrant the attempt. 

(Signed) R. E. LEE, 

General. 



